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Abstract
In Social Networks, it is often interesting to study type of networks formed, its
efficiency with respect to social objective and which networks are stable. Many
work have already been there in this area. Players in network formation game will
incur some cost to form a link. In previous work, all player will have same cost
for forming a link int he network. Here we will the study the optimal network and
Nash equilibrium network when each player have different cost value for forming
the link in the social network.
1 Introduction
A social network is a social structure made of nodes (which are generally individuals or organiza-
tions). Nodes are tied by one or more specific types of interdependency, such as values, visions,
ideas, financial, exchange, friendship, kin- ship, dislike, conflict or trade. The resulting graph-based
structures are often very complex. Problems in Social Net- works are 1) Type of networks formed
and its efficiency with respect to social objective, 2) Diffusion of innovations theory explores social
networks and their role in influencing the spread of new ideas and practices and 3) Searching in So-
cial Networks. In network formation game, the Players are nodes, and their strategy choices create
an undirected graph. Each node chooses a subset of the other nodes, and lays down edges to them.
The edges are undirected, in that, once in- stalled, they can be used in both directions, independently
of which node paid for the installation. The union of these sets of edges is the resulting graph.
2 Previous Work
Often, we need to find how inefficient is the network formed. Some of the measures of inefficiency
[1, 2] of equilibrium are, Price of anarchy and Price of Stability. Price of anarchy is defined as the
ratio between the worst objective function value of an equilibrium of the game and that of an optimal
outcome. Price of Stability is defined as the ratio between the best objective function value of one
of its equilibria and that of an optimal outcome. In [3, 4], authors proposed the following model for
the network formation game and derived bounds on Price of anarchy.
The Model is described as follows. Player [n] = {0, 1, 2, ..., n− 1}, Strategy Space Si = 2[n]−{i}
and Strategy Profile s = {s0, s1, s2, ..., sn−1} where si ∈ Si. Graph formed in this setting is
G[s] = {[n],∪n−1i=0 (i× si)}. Cost for each player in this game is ci(s) = α.|si|+
∑n−1
j=0 dG(s)(i, j),
where α is cost for an edge and dG(s)(i, j) is distance between i, j in G.
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3 The New Model
In this new model, cost for forming the link by player i is αi. That is, each user have different cost
value to build the link. Cost for each player in this setting is ci(s) = αi|si| +
∑n−1
j=0 dG(s)(i, j),
where dG(s)(i, j) is distance between i, j in G.
4 Nash Equilibrium
With out loss of generality consider αi ≤ α2 ≤ ... ≤ αn. The Nash equilibrium with different
condition on values of alpha is as follows.
Case 1: αn ≤ 1
If αn ≤ 1, then complete graph is a Nash equilibrium. Since αn ≤ 1, if any node tries to remove an
edge, distance will increase by 1 but cost for forming link is less or equal to 1.
Case 2: α1 > 1
If α1 > 1, then star graph is a Nash equilibrium. Since α1 > 1, if any node tries to add an edge,
distance will decrease by 1 but cost for forming link is greater than 1.
Case 3: General Case
Consider a node j such that αj ≤ 1 and αj+1 > 1. If there exist node j such that αj ≤ 1 and
αj+1 > 1, then Nash equilibrium graph will contain clique of size j and n − j nodes connected to
first j nodes.
5 Social Cost
Social Cost of the network in this will be
C(G) =
∑
i
ci =
n∑
j=1
αj |sj |+
∑
u,v
dG(u, v)
. One lower bound on social cost is
C(G) ≤ .|E|+ 2|E|+ 2(n(n− 1)− 2|E|)
C(G) ≤ 2n(n− 1) + (α1 − 2)|E|
This is using the fact that there will 2|E| pairs of node will have dsitance one and all other pairs of
node will have distance atleast two. If there is and edge (i, j) in optimal network, then i < j, then
Ce(i, j) = αi.
Case 1: α1 > 2
C(G) ≥ 2n(n − 1) + (α1 − 2)|E|. |E| should be minimum to minimize the social cost. So star
graph is the social optimal solution because |E| is n− 1 which is minimum in any connected graph
and distance function is minimum in the star graph.
Case 2: α1 ≤ 2
C(G) ≥ 2n(n− 1) + (α1 − 2)|E|. |E| should be maximum to minimize the social cost. So node
1 should form maximum number of links. Lower bound on social cost in terms of node 2 given
α1 < 2 is
C(G) ≥ α1.(n− 1) + α2(|E| − n+ 1) + 2|E|+ 2(n(n− 1)− 2|E|)
C(G) ≥ α1(n− 1) + (α2 − 2)|E| − (n− 1)(α2 − 2n)
Case 3: α2 < 2
C(G) ≥ α1(n − 1) + (α2 − 2)|E| − (n − 1)(α2 − 2n). |E| should be maximum to minimize the
social cost. So node 1 and node 2 should form maximum number of links.
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Case 4: αn < 2
Social optimal network is coplete network. Because |E| should be maximum to minimize the social
cost. So complete graph contains maximum number of edges and distance is also minimum in the
complete graph.
Case 5: General Case
If there exist node j such that αj ≤ 2 and αj+1 > 2, then social optimal graph will contain clique
of size j and n− j nodes connected to first j nodes.
6 Future Work
We will come up with the lower bound on price of anarchy for general case. We will apply Myerson
Value o this scenario in order to get cost for paying for the link. This will be similar to the Bargaining
in networks and Myerson paper.
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